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  • Privacy Policy and Terms & Conditions | Act4YourFreedom

    Act4YourFreedom Privacy Poli cy 07/09/2023 Our contact details ​ Name: Act4YourFreedom Website: E-mail: ​ The type of personal information we collect ​ We currently collect and process the following information: ​ Full name Email address Phone number Telegram handle ​ How we get the personal information and why we have it ​ Most of the personal information we process is provided to us directly by you for one of the following reasons: ​ To ask a question To get a query answered To comment on the work we do Provide us with new information or knowledge To join our team To get in contact with one of the members of our team To join our telegram group ​ We collect this information from you when you fill out and submit the form on the ‘contact us’ page. We use the information that you have given us in order to identify who is contacting us and to ensure we can reply (if needed). We may share this information with group members. We may ask for your consent to send your details to individuals who we believe to be best suited to provide a suitable response to a question, query or comment raised by you to provide you with a more indepth and appropriate answer. We do not knowingly share your information with marketing companies. Under the UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR), the lawful bases we rely on for processing this information are: (a) We have a legal obligation. (b) We have a legitimate interest. ​ How we store your personal information ​ Your information is securely stored. We keep full names, email addresses and phone numbers for 12 months. We store this information within the website database. We will then dispose of your information by deleting it from our database. ​ Your data protection rights ​ Under data protection law, you have rights including: ​ Your right of access - You have the right to ask us for copies of your personal information. 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  • Accione en España | Actions | Act4YourFreedom

    Acciones en España Acciones de la OMS Carta a los parlamentarios contra las enmiendas al Reglamento Sanitario Internacional (RSI) de la OMS Lanzamiento Campaña

  • Take Action Italiano | Act4YourFreedom

    L'OMS sta pianificando un colpo di stato Dobbiamo passare all’ azione! L'OMS sta attualmente tentando una presa di potere. L'OMS si sta muovendo per diventare il governo globale per le emergenze sanitarie. ​ Nel silenzio dei media mainstream, la controinformazione riempie il vuoto offrendo troppo spesso informazioni confuse e/o inesatte. Come sperare di creare azione politica efficace senza informazioni chiare ed accurate. ​ Agite ORA Clicca qui Proveremo a far chiarezza: ​ Le riunioni e discussioni sulle proposte di Emendamento del Regolamento Internazionale della Salute dell'OMS (RIS, 2005) continuano ad essere per lo piu’ ignorate, mentre tutta l'attenzione sembra dedicata al “Trattato Pandemico” – il WHO CA+, cioe’ Convenzione, Accordo e Altro Strumento Internazionale dell’ OMS sulla Prevenzione, la Preparazione e la Risposta alle Pandemie. ​ Il risultato e’ che in molti confondono le due proposte come se fossero la stessa cosa, ma NON lo sono . In piu’, da un certo punto di vista, gli Emendamenti al RIS (2005) sono piu’ preoccupanti in quanto rappresentano una modifica ad un regolamento dell’ OMS gia’ esistente e NON richiedono il voto parlamentare , mentre il “Trattato” , in quanto accordo totalmente nuovo, potra’ entrare in vigore solo dopo essere passato al vaglio dei parlamenti (almeno nei paesi in cui e’ imposto dalla legge). Il WHO CA+: ​ ll “Trattato Pandemico” (WHO CA+) NON è un trattato , ma e’ una Convenzione Quadro (Framework Convention). L’ obiettivo principale di questo tipo di strumento e’ quello di creare un nuovo apparato burocratico (Conferenza delle Parti o COP ) che avra’ carta bianca nel generare FUTURI protocolli sanitari in material emergenziale. ​ Teniamo presente che i 17 Obiettivi di Sviluppo Sostenibile (SDGs) dell ‘ONU sul Cambiamento Climatico sono stati prodotti da questo tipo di apparato burocratico (non eletto e totalmente privo di responsabilita’politica), chiamato anch’esso COP. Il “Trattato” o meglio Convenzione WHO CA+ dell’OMS ha subito diverse revisioni e ad ognuna e’ stato dato man mano un nuovo nome: ​ "Rough Draft" Luglio 2022 "Conceptual Zero Draft" Novembre 2022 "Zero Draft" Febbraio 2023 "Bureaux text" Giugno 2023 Le bozze di revisione del WHO CA+ sono tutte state pubblicate e messe a disposizione del pubblico, ma le discussioni al tavolo dei negoziati non sono mai state finora rese pubbliche e rimangono a tutto’ oggi coperte da totale segretezza. La scadenza per il WHO CA+ e’ il 27maggio-1giugno 2024 . La bozza finale sara’ presentata e firmata alla 77ima Assemblea Generale dell’ OMS. Se adottato secondo l’ Articolo 19 della Costituzione OMS, l’accordo finale richiedera’ la ratifica dei due-terzi degli Stati membri. Se ratificato, diventera’ legalmente vincolante secondo il diritto internazionale. Le discussioni dell' Intergovernamental Negotiating Body (INB) (la commissione di lavoro dedicata al WHO CA+) si svolgono ad intervalli regolari (le prossime a novembre 2023) e in parallelo (ma separate) alle riunioni del Gruppo di Lavoro al RIS (IHRWG) per gli emendamenti al RIS (2005) dell’ OMS (Regolamento Internazionale della Salute, 2005) - qui il link al calendario pubblicato dall’OMS. Il RIS regola il modo in cui funziona l'OMS. Al momento l’ultima versione di questa raccolta è il RIS (2005) . Due importanti modifiche sono state apportate a maggio 2022 secondo le quali emendamenti future: ​ Gli Stati membri avranno solo 10 mesi dalla notifica per respingerli (attualmente ne hanno ancora 18 ) Futuri emendamenti entreranno in vigore 12 mesi dalla notifica agli Stati (anziché gli attuali 24 mesi ) ​ Questi due emendamenti entreranno in vigore il 1 dicembre 2023 (teoricamente gli Stati hanno ancora tempo fino al 30 novembre 2023 per respingerli ). ​ Si noti: gli Stati membri hanno fino al 1 dicembre 2023 per rigettare questi 2 emendamenti adottati dall ‘assemblea Generale a Maggio 2022 (e teoricamente gli Stati hanno ancora tempo di inviare una lettera ufficiale e respingerli). ​ L'OMS sta attualmente discutendo 307 nuove proposte di emendamento al RIS (2005) che, se adottate, cambieranno radicalmente il modo di funzionamento dell' OMS. ​ Tutte le future decisioni dell'OMS durante emergenze sanitarie saranno giuridicamente vincolanti e non più semplici raccomandazioni agli Stati membri. L' OMS avrà l'autorità di limitare le libertà personali dei cittadini . L' OMS avrà l'autorità di imporre il controllo dei dati digitali riservati alla popolazione mondiale. L' OMS sarà in grado di imporre identificatori biologici a tutti i viaggiatori. L'OMS otterrà il totale controllo della catena di approvvigionamento e rete logistica in emergenze di salute mondiale . L' OMS chiede un nuovo strumento finanziario , cioe’ un Fondo – "un meccanismo finanziario internazionale" per pianificare, preparare e gestire le nuove infrastrutture dedicate alle future emergenze di salute pubblica (Public Health Emergencies of International Concern – o PHEIC). ​ A questo proposito notare che: ​ Questo nuovo "strumento finanziario" distribuirà risorse secondo il principio d’'equità (chi sara’ a decidere’?) – Art. 44, p.23. È "istituito per fornire le risorse finanziarie su base sovvenzionata o agevolata ai paesi in via di sviluppo... " (trasferimento di ricchezza o debito? o entrambi?) -Art. 44A, pag. 25. "L' OMS potenziera’ le sue capacità di: “…combattere la contro- e la dis-informazione.. ” (cioe’ ricevera’ sostegno finanziario alla censura) - Allegato 1 (Nuovo 7) p. 36. E cosa ancor piu’ importante, chi gestirà questo "Fondo"? Continua a leggere per scoprirlo. La scadenza per gli emendamenti al RIS (2005): ​ L'Assemblea Generale dell'OMS si riunirà ufficialmente per vagliare le 307 proposte di emendamento il 27 maggio - 1 giugno 2024 (e non a novembre 2023, some invece spesso affermato). ​ Gli Stati avranno fino a marzo 2025 per respingere questo pacchetto di emendamenti. ​ Dopodiche’ gli emendamenti diventeranno vincolanti 12 mesi dopo la notifica ai singoli Stati (e il tutto senza necessita’ di vaglio parlamentare). ​ Entrambi - sia i 307 emendamenti al RIS che il “Trattato” WHO CA+ - saranno adottati all’ Assemblea Generale a maggio del 2024 da delegati sconosciuti, non eletti e privi di responsabilita’ politica . ​ Ci auguriamo l’informazione di cui sopra abbia contribuito a farvi comprendere la serieta’ della posta in gioco e che I tempi, benche’ stretti, non sono cosi ristretti come sostenuto da molti. Questo dovrebbe motivarci ad una campagna d’azione rivolta ai parlamentari, ai ministri, ai sindaci, ecc al fine di aumentare la loro consapevolezza della seria minaccia rappresentata dal sopra-descritto piano dell’ OMS. ​ A tal fine abbiamo collaborato con l'attivista ed esperto sull'argomento, l'americano James Roguski (vedi link) e con il suo aiuto abbiamo preparato una lettera gia’ pronta da inviare ai parlamentari e/o ai ministri – clicca qui . Per sostenervi in questa urgente campagna abbiamo anche caricato un elenco aggiornato dai loro indirizzi mail – clicca qui . ​ Invitiamo tutti a prendere seriamente la questione perche’ anche l’Assemblea Generale dell’ ONU (da non confondere con l’ Assemblea Generale dell’ OMS) si sta muovendo per facilitare questo processo e se ne anticipa l’ adozione di una Dichiarazione Politica sulla Prevenzione, la Preparazione e la Risposta alle Pandemie all’ Assemblea Generale(ONU) del 20 settembre 2023 – cio’ era stato annunciato dall'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite gia’ un anno fa, il 2 settembre 2022 in quasi completo silenzio dei media (tutti). Questo è probabilmente ciò che piu’ di tutto sta contribuendo a demoralizzare e paralizzare l'azione politica - se le notizie vengono rilasciate in ritardo e con scadenze imprecise c'è una sensazione di impotenza (è troppo tardi, fatto compiuto, ecc.) che gioca a favore dell' OMS e dell’ ONU. Vorremmo anche sottolineare che i media tendono a trascurare il fatto forse piu’ importante, cioe’ lo sforzo concertato dell’ ONU d ell’ OMS nel procurarsi ingenti fondi e il controllo di “investimenti finanziari” in future emergenze sanitarie di carattere internazionale . ​ Sotto mostriamo un estratto dal “Zero Draft” di questa Dichiarazione Politica delle Nazioni Unite sulla Prevenzione, Preparazione e Risposta alle Pandemie: ​ "Ricordiamo che il finanziamento di un'efficace preparazione alle emergenze sanitarie nazionali, regionali e globali richiederà circa 30 miliardi di dollari all' anno oltre agli attuali livelli di assistenza allo sviluppo ”. PP29 (pagina 5 ) ​ Alla vigilia dell’Assemblea Generale dell ‘ONU del 18-20 settembre 2023, in una lettera al Presidente dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite (datata 17 settembre 2023), 11 Stati membri - Russia, Bielorussia, Bolivia, Cuba, Corea del Nord, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, Siria, Venezuela e Zimbabwe – hanno espresso rimostranze procedurali e politiche contro le Dichiarazioni Politiche delle Nazioni Unite, ivi compresa l’annunciata Dichiarazione Politica sulla Prevenzione, Preparazione e Risposta alle Pandemie. In apparenza, i suddetti paesi sembrerebbero opporsi alle citate dichiarazioni ONU, ma se ignoriamo la retorica e la querimonia atta solo a ricordarci che i paesi "in via di sviluppo" sono in qualche modo maltrattati e / o ignorati, nella sostanza cio’ di cui si lamentano e’ la mancanza di chiarezza riguardo alla loro quota di investimenti sia nelle agende sullo sviluppo "sostenibile" che in quelle legate alla salute e (mentre spingono l'agenda green sia in patria che nei consessi internazionali) chiedono di non essere "puniti" per il loro ritardo nei tempi. È importante sottolineare che questi 11 paesi sono alleati tradizionali della Russia e la natura equivoca della loro strategia e’ palese sia nella loro scelta del linguaggio, vago e velato, che nella conclusione alla lettera dove sembrano invece dare per scontata l'adozione delle Dichiarazioni ONU quando affermano: "Quindi, in una fase successive, ci aspettiamo che abbia luogo un processo abbia in cui l'Assemblea Generale prenderà formalmente in considerazione l'adozione del progetto di Dichiarazione Politica, ai sensi del Capitolo XII del Regolamento Interno dell'Assemblea Generale”. ​ Vi ringraziamo per essere stati con noi. Clicca qui per il testo pubblicato delle proposte di emendamento dei RSI dell'OMS (inglese). Clicca qui per la versione italiano del testo pubblicato delle proposte di emendamento dell'OMS IHRs 307. Clicca qui per il "Bureaux Text" (ultima versione del WHO CA+. Clicca qui per la "Zero Draft" della Dichiarazione politica delle Nazioni Unite sulla prevenzione, la preparazione e la riposta alle pandemie. Clicca qui per 100 Ragioni per fermare la corsa al potere dell'OMS

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World News (74)

  • Bunting’s map and Israel on China’s new silk road

    Yossef Bodansky, an Israeli-American political scientist and senior editor of GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, wrote an insightful article in their September issue regarding the convergence of China’s Afro-Eurasian integration project and Bunting’s map of the world as a clover leaf. Die ganze Welt in einem Kleberblat (The entire World in a Cloverleaf). Jerusalem is in the centre of the map surrounded by the three continents. Source: Wikipedia. Heinrich Bunting was a German Protestant pastor, theologist and cartographer, and in his masterpiece Itinerarium Sacrae Scripturae (Travel Through Holy Scripture) in 1581, he portrayed the world that mattered was comprised of the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, with each depicted as a cloverleaf.  They converged in Jerusalem, and the rest of the world was irrelevant. In his article entitled “The History of What’s Next”, Bodansky argued that the Bunting map is likely the best depiction of the unfolding global geopolitical architecture of the 21st  century.  With the demise of the Arab modern state and Sykes-Picot post-Arab Spring, “Libya, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are no more, and Jordan and Yemen are not far behind.” Instead, what is arising is the merging of the greater Middle East and the greater framework of the reawakened Mackinderian world order.  And, the clover leaf world centred on Jerusalem is converging with China’s One Belt, One Road project. Israel as key node on China’s New Silk Road With the rise of Salafi-jihadism in the Middle East increasingly threatening China’s overseas citizens and assets, especially to their maritime trade via the Suez Canal, Israel is emerging as a strategic node on China’s southern corridor on the New Silk Road. As the worlds’ largest trading nation and with over 95% of global trade still being seaborne, Beijing is heavily dependent on the Canal to reach its largest export market in Europe—with trade volume at €521 billion in 2015. Geography matters, and the Middle East is also where China imports more than half of its crude oil. However, the presence of ISIS, Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups in the Sinai are threatening China’s maritime trade. As such, China is building a “steel canal” of the Med-Red Railway through Israel to connect the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea that bypasses the Suez. This was especially prompted by an incident in 2013 when Al Furqun Brigade, an Al Qaeda affiliate, attacked China’s COSCO container ship by firing Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) while it was in the Suez Canal en route to northern Europe. With increased military activity and ship inspections in the Suez, maritime insurance company Lloyd’s List recommended that ships take the 6,000-mile (almost 9,700 kilometers) longer route around the Cape of Good Hope—essentially around the entire African continent. These shipping delays and risk premiums are costly for China. Although Beijing is building overland networks of railroads and highways as part of the planned Silk Road economic belt across Eurasia, these routes are a diversification, not replacement, of important maritime transport corridors. Israel as a regional power Thus the rise of Israel as a key node in China’s Silk Road grand strategy not only elevates Jerusalem in China’s strategic calculus, but as Jean Michel Valantin of The Red Team Analysis Society argued, also presents a new status of Israel from a “protected power” of the US to an “integrated regional power” in its own right, transforming Israel’s traditional narrative of seeking “protectors” to one of seeking partners. The emergence of Israel as a Mediterranean energy player, its continued stability and robust military power in a neighborhood of unstable and weakening Arab states, and outreach to the eastern hemisphere by joining Turkey and Egypt in their applications to the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is thus slowly creating a new regional and international systems of shared interest between Mideast countries and the Middle Kingdom. Nonetheless, Syria remains a thorny issue between Israel and China as well as with Russia and India, due to Jerusalem’s support for the opposition that consists of jihadists from these countries. The August 30 terrorist attack on China’s embassy in Kyrgyzstan by Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP/ETIM) in Idlib, Syria, financed by the re-branded al Nusra Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS) and coordinated from Turkey, demonstrates how terrorist haven in Syria is increasingly threatening China’s energy, maritime, and human security. With Russia, China and India now increasing support for the Syrian government that is helping them fight Eurasian militants in the Army of Conquest, while Israel understandably sides with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar to back them, this risks misunderstanding and miscalculation between Jerusalem and rising Eurasian powers. As such it is important for Israel to establish a cooperative platform for deconfliction and crisis management with China regarding Syria, as it has done with Russia, especially now that Chinese military advisors are on the ground and will likely increase its footprint with the recent military agreement with Damascus. If Israel could balance its status as a traditional “protectorate” of Uncle Sam and its emerging trajectory as a “regional power” with additional partners, and take stock not only of US interests but also legitimate interests of new Mideast actors such as China and Russia, it could help manage the transition and maintain relative stability as the greater middle east continues to converge with China’s Afro-Eurasian integration project.  And along with this, perhaps a resurrection of Bunting’s Cloverleaf world and a return to history. October 1th 2016

  • The Hunt for the Kill Switch

    Are chip makers building electronic trapdoors in key military hardware? The Pentagon is making its biggest effort yet to find out Last September, Israeli jets bombed a suspected nuclear installation in northeastern Syria. Among the many mysteries still surrounding that strike was the failure of a Syrian radar—supposedly state-of-the-art—to warn the Syrian military of the incoming assault. It wasn’t long before military and technology bloggers concluded that this was an incident of electronic warfare—and not just any kind. Post after post speculated that the commercial off-the-shelf microprocessors in the Syrian radar might have been purposely fabricated with a hidden “backdoor” inside. By sending a preprogrammed code to those chips, an unknown antagonist had disrupted the chips’ function and temporarily blocked the radar. That same basic scenario is cropping up more frequently lately, and not just in the Middle East, where conspiracy theories abound. According to a U.S. defense contractor who spoke on condition of anonymity, a “European chip maker” recently built into its microprocessors a kill switch that could be accessed remotely. French defense contractors have used the chips in military equipment, the contractor told IEEE Spectrum. If in the future the equipment fell into hostile hands, “the French wanted a way to disable that circuit,” he said. Spectrum could not confirm this account independently, but spirited discussion about it among researchers and another defense contractor last summer at a military research conference reveals a lot about the fever dreams plaguing the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Feeding those dreams is the Pentagon’s realization that it no longer controls who manufactures the components that go into its increasingly complex systems. A single plane like the DOD’s next generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, can contain an “insane number” of chips, says one semiconductor expert familiar with that aircraft’s design. Estimates from other sources put the total at several hundred to more than a thousand. And tracing a part back to its source is not always straightforward. The dwindling of domestic chip and electronics manufacturing in the United States, combined with the phenomenal growth of suppliers in countries like China, has only deepened the U.S. military’s concern. Recognizing this enormous vulnerability, the DOD recently launched its most ambitious program yet to verify the integrity of the electronics that will underpin future additions to its arsenal. In December, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon’s R&D wing, released details about a three-year initiative it calls the Trust in Integrated Circuits program. The findings from the program could give the military—and defense contractors who make sensitive microelectronics like the weapons systems for the F-35—a guaranteed method of determining whether their chips have been compromised. In January, the Trust program started its prequalifying rounds by sending to three contractors four identical versions of a chip that contained unspecified malicious circuitry. The teams have until the end of this month to ferret out as many of the devious insertions as they can. Vetting a chip with a hidden agenda can’t be all that tough, right? Wrong. Although commercial chip makers routinely and exhaustively test chips with hundreds of millions of logic gates, they can’t afford to inspect everything. So instead they focus on how well the chip performs specific functions. For a microprocessor destined for use in a cellphone, for instance, the chip maker will check to see whether all the phone’s various functions work. Any extraneous circuitry that doesn’t interfere with the chip’s normal functions won’t show up in these tests. “You don’t check for the infinite possible things that are not specified,” says electrical engineering professor Ruby Lee, a cryptography expert at Princeton. “You could check the obvious possibilities, but can you test for every unspecified function?” Nor can chip makers afford to test every chip. From a batch of thousands, technicians select a single chip for physical inspection, assuming that the manufacturing process has yielded essentially identical devices. They then laboriously grind away a thin layer of the chip, put the chip into a scanning electron microscope, and then take a picture of it, repeating the process until every layer of the chip has been imaged. Even here, spotting a tiny discrepancy amid a chip’s many layers and millions or billions of transistors is a fantastically difficult task, and the chip is destroyed in the process. But the military can’t really work that way. For ICs destined for mission-critical systems, you’d ideally want to test every chip without destroying it. The upshot is that the Trust program’s challenge is enormous. “We can all do with more verification,” says Samsung’s Victoria Coleman, who helped create the Cyber Trust initiative to secure congressional support for cybersecurity. “My advice to [DARPA director] Tony Tether was ’trust but verify.’ That’s all you can do.” Semiconductor offshoring dates back to the 1960s, when U.S. chip makers began moving the labor-intensive assembly and testing stages to Singapore, Taiwan, and other countries with educated workforces and relatively inexpensive labor. Today only Intel and a few other companies still design and manufacture all their own chips in their own fabrication plants. Other chip designers—including LSI Corp. and most recently Sony—have gone “fabless,” outsourcing their manufacturing to offshore facilities known as foundries. In doing so, they avoid the huge expense of building a state-of-the-art fab, which in 2007 cost as much as US $2 billion to $4 billion. Well into the 1970s, the U.S. military’s status as one of the largest consumers of integrated circuits gave it some control over the industry’s production and manufacturing, so the offshoring trend didn’t pose a big problem. The Pentagon could always find a domestic fab and pay a little more to make highly classified and mission-critical chips. The DOD also maintained its own chip-making plant at Fort Meade, near Washington, D.C., until the early 1980s, when costs became prohibitive. But these days, the U.S. military consumes only about 1 percent of the world’s integrated circuits. “Now,” says Coleman, “all they can do is buy stuff.” Nearly every military system today contains some commercial hardware. It’s a pretty sure bet that the National Security Agency doesn’t fabricate its encryption chips in China. But no entity, no matter how well funded, can afford to manufacture its own safe version of every chip in every piece of equipment. The Pentagon is now caught in a bind. It likes the cheap, cutting-edge devices emerging from commercial foundries and the regular leaps in IC performance the commercial sector is known for. But with those improvements comes the potential for sabotage. “The economy is globalized, but defense is not globalized,” says Coleman. “How do you reconcile the two?” In 2004, the Defense Department created the Trusted Foundries Program to try to ensure an unbroken supply of secure microchips for the government. DOD inspectors have now certified certain commercial chip plants, such as IBM’s Burlington, Vt., facility, as trusted foundries. These plants are then contracted to supply a set number of chips to the Pentagon each year. But Coleman argues that the program blesses a process, not a product. And, she says, the Defense Department’s assumption that onshore assembly is more secure than offshore reveals a blind spot. “Why can’t people put something bad into the chips made right here?” she says. Three years ago, the prestigious Defense Science Board, which advises the DOD on science and technology developments, warned in a report that the continuing shift to overseas chip fabrication would expose the Pentagon’s most mission-critical integrated circuits to sabotage. The board was especially alarmed that no existing tests could detect such compromised chips, which led to the formation of the DARPA Trust in IC program. Where might such an attack originate? U.S. officials invariably mention China and Russia. Kenneth Flamm, a technology expert at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration who is now a professor at the University of Texas at Austin, wouldn’t get that specific but did offer some clues. Each year, secure government computer networks weather thousands of attacks over the Internet. “Some of that probing has come from places where a lot of our electronics are being manufactured,” Flamm says. “And if you’re a responsible defense person, you would be stupid not to look at some of the stuff they’re assembling, to see how else they might try to enter the network.” John Randall, a semiconductor expert at Zyvex Corp., in Richardson, Texas, elaborates that any malefactor who can penetrate government security can find out what chips are being ordered by the Defense Department and then target them for sabotage. “If they can access the chip designs and add the modifications,” Randall says, “then the chips could be manufactured correctly anywhere and still contain the unwanted circuitry.” So what’s the best way to kill a chip? No one agrees on the most likely scenario, and in fact, there seem to be as many potential avenues of attack as there are people working on the problem. But the threats most often mentioned fall into two categories: a kill switch or a backdoor. A kill switch is any manipulation of the chip’s software or hardware that would cause the chip to die outright—to shut off an F-35’s missile-launching electronics, for example. A backdoor, by contrast, lets outsiders gain access to the system through code or hardware to disable or enable a specific function. Because this method works without shutting down the whole chip, users remain unaware of the intrusion. An enemy could use it to bypass battlefield radio encryption, for instance. Depending on the adversary’s degree of sophistication, a kill switch might be controlled to go off at a set time, under certain circumstances, or at random. As an example of the latter, Stanford electrical engineering professor Fabian Pease muses, “I’d nick the [chip’s] copper wiring.” The fault, almost impossible to detect, would make the chip fail early, due to electromigration: as current flowed through the wire, eventually the metal atoms would migrate and form voids, and the wire would break. “If the chip goes into a defense satellite, where it’s supposed to work for 15 years but fails after six months, you have a very expensive, inoperative satellite,” Pease says. But other experts counter that such ideas ignore economic realities. “First and foremost, [the foundries] want to make sure their chips work,” says Coleman. “If a company develops a reputation for making chips that fail early, that company suffers more than anyone else.” A kill switch built to be triggered at will, as was allegedly incorporated into the European microprocessors, would be more difficult and expensive to pull off, but it’s also the more likely threat, says David Adler, a consulting professor of electrical engineering at Stanford, who was previously funded by DARPA to develop chip-testing hardware in an unrelated project. To create a controlled kill switch, you’d need to add extra logic to a microprocessor, which you could do either during manufacturing or during the chip’s design phase. A saboteur could substitute one of the masks used to imprint the pattern of wires and transistors onto the semiconductor wafer, Adler suggests, so that the pattern for just one microchip is different from the rest. “You’re printing pictures from a negative,” he says. “If you change the mask, you can add extra transistors.” Or the extra circuits could be added to the design itself. Chip circuitry these days tends to be created in software modules, which can come from anywhere, notes Dean Collins, deputy director of DARPA’s Microsystems Technology Office and program manager for the Trust in IC initiative. Programmers “browse many sources on the Internet for a component,” he says. “They’ll find a good one made by somebody in Romania, and they’ll put that in their design.” Up to two dozen different software tools may be used to design the chip, and the origin of that software is not always clear, he adds. “That creates two dozen entry points for malicious code.” Collins notes that many defense contractors rely heavily on field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)—a kind of generic chip that can be customized through software. While a ready-made FPGA can be bought for $500, an application-specific IC, or ASIC, can cost anywhere from $4 million to $50 million. “If you make a mistake on an FPGA, hey, you just reprogram it,” says Collins. “That’s the good news. The bad news is that if you put the FPGA in a military system, someone else can reprogram it.” Almost all FPGAs are now made at foundries outside the United States, about 80 percent of them in Taiwan. Defense contractors have no good way of guaranteeing that these economical chips haven’t been tampered with. Building a kill switch into an FPGA could mean embedding as few as 1000 transistors within its many hundreds of millions. “You could do a lot of very interesting things with those extra transistors,” Collins says. The rogue additions would be nearly impossible to spot. Say those 1000 transistors are programmed to respond to a specific 512-bit sequence of numbers. To discover the code using software testing, you might have to cycle through every possible numerical combination of 512-bit sequences. That’s 13.4 × 10153 combinations. (For perspective, the universe has existed for about 4 × 1017 seconds.) And that’s just for the 512-bit number—the actual number of bits in the code would almost certainly be unknown. So you’d have to apply the same calculations to all possible 1024-bit numbers, and maybe even 2048-bit numbers, says Tim Holman, a research associate professor of electrical engineering at Vanderbilt University, in Nashville. “There just isn’t enough time in the universe.” Those extra transistors could create a kill switch or a backdoor in any chip, not just an FPGA. Holman sketches a possible scenario: suppose those added transistors find their way into a networking chip used in the routers connecting the computers in your home, your workplace, banks, and military bases with the Internet. The chip functions perfectly until it receives that 512-bit sequence, which could be transmitted from anywhere in the world. The sequence prompts the router to hang up. Thinking it was the usual kind of bug, tech support would reset the router, but on restart the chip would again immediately hang up, preventing the router from connecting to the outside world. Meanwhile, the same thing would be happening to similarly configured routers the world over. The router scenario also illustrates that the nation’s security and economic well-being depend on shoring up not just military chips but also commercial chips. An adversary who succeeded in embedding a kill switch in every commercial router could devastate national security without ever targeting the Defense Department directly. A kill switch or backdoor built into an encryption chip could have even more disastrous consequences. Today encoding and decoding classified messages is done completely by integrated circuit—no more Enigma machine with its levers and wheels. Most advanced encryption schemes rely on the difficulty that computers have in factoring numbers containing hundreds of digits; discovering a 512-bit type of encryption would take some machines up to 149 million years. Encryption that uses the same code or key to encrypt and decrypt information—as is often true—could easily be compromised by a kill switch or a backdoor. No matter what precautions are taken at the programming level to safeguard that key, one extra block of transistors could undo any amount of cryptography, says John East, CEO of Actel Corp., in Mountain View, Calif., which supplies military FPGAs. “Let’s say I can make changes to an insecure FPGA’s hardware,” says East. “I could easily put a little timer into the circuit. The timer could be programmed with a single command: ’Three weeks after you get your configuration, forget it.’ If the FPGA were to forget its configuration information, the entire security mechanism would be disabled.” Alternately, a kill switch might be programmed to simply shut down encryption chips in military radios; instead of scrambling the signals they transmit, the radios would send their messages in the clear, for anybody to pick up. “Just like we figured out how the Enigma machine worked in World War II,” says Stanford’s Adler, “one of our adversaries could in principle figure out how our electronic Enigma machines work and use that information to decode our classified communications.” Chip alteration can even be done after the device has been manufactured and packaged, provided the design data are available, notes Chad Rue, an engineer with FEI, based in Hillsboro, Ore., which makes specialized equipment for chip editing (albeit for legitimate reasons). FEI’s circuit-editing tools have been around for 20 years, Rue says, and yet “chip designers are still surprised when they hear what they can do.” Skilled circuit editing requires electrical engineering know-how, the blueprints of the chip, and a $2 million refrigerator-size piece of equipment called a focused-ion-beam etching machine, or FIB. A FIB shoots a stream of ions at precise areas on the chip, mechanically milling away tiny amounts of material. FIB lab workers refer to the process as microsurgery, with the beam acting like a tiny scalpel. “You can remove material, cut a metal line, and make new connections,” says Rue. The process can take from hours to several days. But the results can be astonishing: a knowledgeable technician can edit the chip’s design just as easily as if he were taking “an eraser and a pencil to it,” says Adler. Semiconductor companies typically do circuit editing when they’re designing and debugging prototypes. Designers can make changes to any level of the chip’s wiring, not just the top. “It’s not uncommon to dig through eight different layers to get to the intended target,” says Rue.The only thing you can’t do with a FIB is add extra transistors. “But we can reroute signals to the transistors that are already there,” he says. That’s significant because chips commonly contain large blocks of unused circuitry, leftovers from previous versions of the design. “They’re just along for the ride,” Rue says. He thinks it would be possible to use a FIB to rewire a chip to make use of these latent structures. To do so, an adversary would need a tremendous amount of skill with digital circuitry and access to the original design data. Some experts find the idea too impractical to worry about. But an adversary with unlimited funds and time—exactly what the Defense Science Board warned of—could potentially pull it off, Rue says. In short, the potential for tinkering with an integrated circuit is almost limitless, notes Princeton’s Lee. “The hardware design process has many steps,” she says. “At each step, you could do something that would make a particular part of the IC fail.” Clearly, the companies participating in the Trust in IC program have their work cut out for them. As Collins sees it, the result has to be a completely new chip-verification method. He’s divided up the Trust participants into teams: one group to create the test chips from scratch; another to come up with malicious insertions; three more groups, which he calls “performers,” to actually hunt for the errant circuits; and a final group to judge the results. To fabricate the test chips, Collins chose the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He picked MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory to engineer whatever sneaky insertions they could devise, and he tapped Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, in Laurel, Md., to come up with a way to compare and assess the performers’ results. The three performers are Raytheon, Luna Innovations, and Xradia. None of the teams would speak on the record, but their specialties offer some clues to their approach. Xradia, in Concord, Calif., builds nondestructive X-ray microscopes used widely in the semiconductor industry, so it may be looking at a new method of inspecting chips based on soft X-ray tomography, Stanford’s Pease suggests. Soft X-rays are powerful enough to penetrate the chip but not strong enough to do irreversible damage. Luna Innovations, in Roanoke, Va., specializes in creating antitamper features for FPGAs. Princeton’s Lee suggests that Luna’s approach may involve narrowing down the number of possible unspecified functions. “There are ways to determine where such hardware would be inserted,” she says. “Where could they gather the most information? Where would they be least likely to be noticed? That is what they’re looking for.” She compares chip security to a barricaded home. The front door and windows might offer vaultlike protection, but there might be an unknown window in the basement. The Luna researchers, she speculates, may be looking for the on-chip equivalent of the basement window. Raytheon, of Waltham, Mass., has expertise in hardware and logic testing, says Collins. He believes the company will use a more complex version of a technique called Boolean equivalence checking to analyze what types of inputs will generate certain outputs. Normally, applying specific inputs to a circuit will result in specific, predictable outputs, just as hitting a light switch should always cause the light to turn off. “Now look at that process in reverse,” says Collins. Given a certain output (the lights go out), engineers can reconstruct what made it happen (someone hit a switch). Collins says this could help avoid cycling through infinite combinations of inputs to find a single fatal response. In January, the performers were given a set of four test chips, each containing an unknown (to them) number of malicious insertions. Along with a thorough description of the chips, Collins says, “we told them precisely what the circuits were supposed to be.” Each team’s success will be gauged by the number of malicious insertions it can spot. The goal is a 90 percent detection rate, says Collins, with a minimum of false positives. The teams will also have to contend with red herrings: to trip them up, the test set includes fully functioning, uncompromised chips. By the end of this month, the performers will report back to DARPA. After Johns Hopkins has tallied the results, the teams will get a second set of test chips, which they’ll have to analyze by the end of the year. Any performer that doesn’t pass muster will be cut from the program, while the methods developed by the successful ones will be developed further. By the program’s end in 2010, Collins hopes to have a scientifically verifiable method to categorically authenticate a circuit. “There’s not going to be a DARPA seal of approval on them,” says Collins, but both the Army and the Air Force have already expressed interest in adopting whatever technology emerges. Meanwhile, other countries appear to be awakening to the chip threat. At a January hearing, a U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs addressed Pakistan’s ongoing refusal to let the United States help it secure its nuclear arsenal with American technology. Pakistan remains reluctant to allow such intervention, citing fears that the United States would use the opportunity to cripple its weapons with—what else?—a kill switch. Link: Note by Act4YourFreedom: There have been kill switches and backdoors built into hardware for years and this is well known the Intel Management Engine built into Intel's processors is one of the most well known which compromises a large percentage of the worlds computers and servers also the NSA has been requesting hardware and backdoors be built into infrastructure and projects since 2013, which is not mentioned in the article. Link:

  • Israeli innovation is based on theft

    Israel is a settler-colonial state. Maintaining its status as the “Jewish state” in a land whose population is mostly non-Jewish requires a regime of complete and utter brutality. It requires the denial of basic human rights to the Palestinian people. First among those rights to be denied is the right to life, as seen in recent events in Gaza. Israel has killed more than 130 Palestinians in Gaza since 30 March, when the Great March of Return began. More than 100 of those deaths occurred during the protests, and 15 of those were children. Thousands more were injured – very deliberately – by Israeli army snipers aiming to maim and incapacitate. The goal of the demonstrations illustrates the denial of another basic human right by Israel: the right of refugees to return to their homes after a war. For more than 70 years now, Israel has denied this right to millions of Palestinian refugees. And it does so using an explicitly racist justification – that those refugees are not Jewish. Meanwhile, anyone in the world with so much as a Jewish grandparent can “return” to that same land – even if (as is mostly the case) they or their ancestors have never lived in Palestine. This is the brutal reality of a “Jewish state” in Palestine. Israeli leaders know this, and the more frank among their supporters admit as much. One of the more explicit of these was Haifa University demographer Arnon Soffer, once a key advisor to the late Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. In a notorious 2004 interview with the Jerusalem Post, Soffer predicted that when 2.5 million people live in a closed-off Gaza ,“it’s going to be a human catastrophe… if we want to remain alive, we will have to kill and kill and kill. All day, every day”. These truths mean that it’s fundamentally difficult for Israel to maintain international support. And so it has resorted to various marketing and PR techniques, in an increasingly desperate manner. One of these is the selling of Israel as a “high tech innovator”. There is an entire organisation devoted to it: Israel21c. Its website puts out puff pieces promoting Israel as a wonderful land of technological marvels and green innovation. As well as the standard shady influence peddling tactics beloved of PR firms around the world (former New York Times Jerusalem bureau chief Jodi Rudoren’s final piece from Israel was basically a rewrite of one of their press releases), Israel21c has used more explicitly deceptive methods. #LandGrab As I reported in 2014, the group aimed to infiltrate its propaganda into social media using paid operatives – on the condition that they kept their links to Israel21c a secret. This method of “tech-washing” is morally bankrupt at the most fundamental level. Even if it were the case that Israel is the source of all the most wonderful technology in the world, it would in no way justify its decades of military occupation, institutionalised racism and slaughter of unarmed protesters, including children. But as it turns out, Israel’s claims to be a tech innovator are often baseless, even on their own terms. One of the Israeli arms industry’s most frequent boasts is that its weapons are “field tested” – in other words they have used Palestinians as guinea pigs. But much of the very foundation of Israeli high technology was actually acquired from France and the United States – in some cases it was stolen. A 1983 report by the US Government Accountability Office details the extent to which Israeli arms firms relied on foreign assistance to establish themselves. “Israel’s technological exports are heavily dependent on foreign components”, it read (on page 43). “Israeli officials estimate that during 1981-1982, most of their exports contained an import component of about 36 per cent. In Israel’s fastest growing industry, the electronics field, about 35 per cent of the technical expertise is acquired from the United States in licensed production or technology transfer. Almost every Israeli arms production effort includes a US input.” A secret 1979 CIA document profiling Israel’s intelligence agencies (which was “declassified” by the Iranian students who took over the US embassy in Tehran after the Islamic revolution) showed American high-tech firms were a priority target for Israeli spy agencies. Priority number two (after spying on Arab states) was listed as collecting “information on secret US policy… concerning Israel”. The third top priority was “collection of scientific intelligence in the US and other developed countries”. Such spying was apparently considered a higher priority intelligence target than even the USSR. Probably the most high-profile case of Israeli spying on the US was Jonathan Pollard – the US Naval Intelligence officer who turned traitor and sold top-level US secrets to Israel, apartheid South Africa and even the USSR. He was caught in 1985 and received a life sentence but was released by former President Obama in 2015. Pollard worked for LAKAM, the so-called “Bureau of Scientific Relations” which stole high-tech intelligence from government and industry sources around the world. LAKAM was wound up after Pollard was exposed, but its work no doubt passed on to other agencies. According to journalists Alexander and Leslie Cockburn, Israel also stole blueprints for a fighter-jet engine from a French firm after de Gaulle embargoed any further military supplies to Israel in reaction to the 1967 war. Innovative methods indeed. 28th June 2018

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